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Interoception, the sense of the physiological condition of the body, provides a basis
for subjective feelings and emotions. Anterior insular cortex activity represents the state
of the body and varies according to personality traits, such as emotional susceptibility
(ES)—the tendency to experience feelings of discomfort and vulnerability when facing
emotionally-laden stimuli. The accuracy of perceiving one’s own bodily signals, or
interoceptive accuracy (IAc), can be assessed with the heartbeat perception task
(HPT), which is the experimental measure used by most of the existing research on
interoception. However, IAc is only one facet of interoception. Interoceptive awareness
(IAw) is the conscious perception of sensations from inside the body, such as heart beat,
respiration, satiety, and the autonomic nervous system sensations related to emotions,
which create the sense of the physiological condition of the body. We developed an
Italian version of the recent self-report Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive
Awareness (MAIA), tested its psychometric properties (reliability, dimensionality, and
construct validity), and examined its relationship to ES, as assessed using the Emotional
Susceptibility Scale, in a sample (n = 321) of healthy Italian psychology students (293
females, mean age: 20.5 years). In a subgroup of females (n = 135), we measured IAc
with the HPT.We used a series of correlation/regression analyses to examine the complex
interplay between the three constructs. We provide further evidence for a substantial
independence of the IAc and IAw measures, confirming previous reports and current
theoretical models that differentiate between IAc and IAw. Our analyses elucidate the
complex relationship between distinct dimensions of IAw and ES, highlighting the need
for continued efforts to shed more light on this topic.
Keywords: interoception, personality, heartbeat, MAIA, interoceptive awareness, interoceptive accuracy,
emotional susceptibility
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Introduction
Interoception has been classically conceived of as the sense of the
physiological condition specifically of the viscera, as opposed to
the five senses (see also Sherrington, 1948). However, subsequent
research has led to a redefinition of the classical conception
of interoception as the sense of the physiological condition of
the entire body (Craig et al., 1996, 2000; Craig, 2002; Saper,
2002). The neurological correlates of interoceptive processes have
been well-defined. They convey information essential to the
maintenance of an optimal physiological balance in the body—
the physiological system’s homeostasis—through autonomic,
neuroendocrine, and behavioral responses. Interoception has
thus been proposed as a core facet of motivational regulation
of behavior and cognition (Craig, 2002; Singer et al., 2009). The
progressive meta-representation of the physiological condition
of the body from posterior to anterior insula (Farb et al.,
2013) enables an integration of homeostatic afferent inputs with
information from other limbic regions involved in motivation
and emotions and from the prefrontal cortex involved in
planning (Chikama et al., 1997; Adolphs, 2002; Brooks et al.,
2002; Craig, 2002; Olausson et al., 2002). Perception and feedback
of interoceptive signals is considered an essential aspect in many
theories of emotion (Darwin, 1873; James, 1884; Schachter and
Singer, 1962; Damasio, 1994) and has become the subject of
research exploring the relationship between interoception and
emotional experience.
Interestingly, activity of the anterior insular cortex also
appears to be modulated by specific personality traits, such
as neuroticism or emotional susceptibility (ES). This latter
personality trait, measured by self-report through the Emotional
Susceptibility Scale (Caprara et al., 1985), relates to the tendency
to experience feelings of discomfort, helplessness, inadequacy,
and vulnerability after exposure to emotionally salient stimuli. ES
is viewed as reflecting an individual’s inclination to experience
a state of negative affect and as a tendency to place oneself in
a defensive position due to the inability to control excitement,
arousal, and reactions in situations—real or imagined—of
danger, offense, threat, or attack. Therefore, this personality
trait may be of particular relevance for individual differences in
reactions to emotional stimuli, particularly to the experienced
intensity of affective states, or their arousal dimensions (Bradley
and Lang, 1994), which is reflected in the activity of the
autonomic nervous system. In an fMRI study, the ES personality
trait has been shown to be associated with insular activity (Iaria
et al., 2008): participants with high ES scores, as compared to
those with low ES scores, showed greater activity within the
anterior insula during processing of visual stimuli with emotional
content, independent of the stimuli’s valence (i.e., positive vs.
negative affect). In another study (Ebisch et al., submitted),
high ES participants showed greater anterior insular activity
in response to neutral gustatory stimuli when interspersed
between distasteful and pleasant-tasting affective stimuli. These
findings suggest the implication of interoceptive processes in
the modulation of basic emotional processing by the ES trait.
Although a potential association between ES and interoception
has yet to be explored, there is a growing body of evidence
supporting the idea that the insula is a key region involved in
interoception and emotion (e.g., Zaki et al., 2012; Ernst et al.,
2013). Moreover, how interoception is involved in emotional
processing has been studied over the last several years (e.g.,
Wiens, 2005; Craig, 2008; Pollatos and Schandry, 2008; Garfinkel
et al., 2014). These studies have suggested that individuals with
stronger interoceptive ability report more intense emotions (e.g.,
Wiens et al., 2000), place a stronger emphasis on the arousal
dimension in reporting their emotional experience (Barrett et al.,
2004), and show a stronger link between their body reactions
to emotional stimuli and their subjective arousal ratings (Dunn
et al., 2010). Moreover, interoceptive accuracy has been shown
to be positively correlated to measures of central and peripheral
processing of emotional stimuli (Pollatos et al., 2005, 2007;
Herbert et al., 2007).
However, investigations of the relationship between
interoceptive ability and emotional processing have used a
variety of measures of interoception, which has triggered recent
attempts at more clearly defining the different constructs and
measures related to interoception, such as interoceptive accuracy
(IAc) and awareness (IAw) (Farb et al., 2015; Garfinkel et al.,
2015). Ceunen et al. (2013), for example, defined IAc as the ability
to accurately perceive changes in the homeostatic function and
IAw as the conscious perception of these body signals, expressing
disagreement with the idea that cardiac interoceptive awareness
is reflected in and appropriately assessed as the sensorial accuracy
in perceiving one’s own cardiac signals (e.g., Herbert et al., 2012).
Ceunen et al. (2013) proposed that the equivalence between
the two concepts probably derives from the “interoceptive
sensitivity hypothesis” (Tyrer, 1973; Ehlers and Breuer, 1992),
according to which highly anxious individuals and patients with
panic disorder—conditions associated with a high symptom
awareness level (IAw)—have highly accurate perceptions of
anxiety-related bodily sensations (IAc). Ceunen et al. suggested:
“IAw should be taken to mean the cognizant, mindful perception
of bodily signals [. . . ]. Although IAw can be accompanied by
an accurate perception of bodily sensations, such accuracy is
not necessarily implied” (Ceunen et al., 2013). This suggestion
is clearly supported by recent research, which has led to a
more differentiated theoretical model of interoception processes
(Garfinkel et al., 2015). However, the definition of IAw we are
using here, which was developed in focus groups of clinicians and
patients and applied in the recently developed Multidimensional
Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling
et al., 2012), does not exactly correspond to that provided by
Garfinkel and Critchley (2013) and Garfinkel et al. (2015). The
latter was operationalized as “a metacognitive measure that
quantifies individuals’ explicit knowledge of (and confidence
in) their interoceptive accuracy” (Garfinkel and Critchley,
2013, p. 233), or “the correspondence between objective IAc
and subjective report, i.e., metacognition” (Garfinkel et al.,
2015). This pragmatic operationalization of IAw is based on
signal-detection theory and reduces the IAw construct to a
measure for the extent to which self-reported confidence of
perception predicts the accuracy of perception. Our view of
the IAw construct, as applied to this study, is also broader
and more complex than the conceptualization of interoceptive
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sensibility, defined as the “self-perceived dispositional tendency
to be internally self-focused and interoceptively cognizant”
(Garfinkel et al., 2015) and assessed by self-report questionnaires
regarding specific bodily sensations or self-rated confidence in
one’s perceptual ability. We incorporated the earlier, broader
definition by Cameron of IAw as awareness of “the afferent
information that arises from anywhere and everywhere within
the body . . . [involving] higher mental processes such as
emotions, conscious awareness, and behavior” (Cameron,
2001), differentiated further through qualitative analyses
from clinically-oriented focus groups (Mehling et al., 2011).
By including these attitudinal, appraisal, and self-regulatory
aspects of IAw, our conceptualization of IAw extends beyond
interoceptive sensibility, which nevertheless remains as one of
the dimensions (“Noticing”) in the multidimensional self-report
MAIA (Mehling et al., 2012). The pragmatic operationalization
of IAw as metacognition is clearly innovative in that it extends
beyond self-report, but it appears to strip the construct of some of
its psychological, particularly its regulatory, aspects (Bornemann
et al., 2014).
The most commonly applied objective measures of
interoceptive ability are two different types of Heartbeat
Perception Tasks (HPT): the tracking task (Schandry, 1981), in
which the perception of cardiac activity is measured by asking
the participant to count his/her heartbeats within a defined
time interval, and the discrimination task (Whitehead et al.,
1977), in which the participant is asked to discriminate between
exteroceptive (auditory or visual) and interoceptive (heartbeat)
signals. Both methods provide a measure of the individual’s
interoceptive accuracy (IAc), which in turn has been taken in
various earlier studies as an index of one’s awareness of one’s own
bodily sensations, that is, a measure of interoceptive awareness
(IAw). Yet early findings showed that IAw, as assessed by
self-report measures, does not necessarily predict actual IAc,
as assessed experimentally by HPT (e.g., McFarland, 1975).
Consequently, in recent years, numerous authors (Wiens, 2005;
Mehling et al., 2009; Ceunen et al., 2013; Garfinkel and Critchley,
2013; Bornemann et al., 2014; Farb et al., 2015; Garfinkel et al.,
2015) have highlighted the need to discriminate between IAc and
IAw and to better define interoception-related constructs. Still,
IAc is currently viewed as the central construct underpinning
other interoceptive measures (Garfinkel et al., 2015).
In reviewing existing self-report questionnaires on body
awareness, which includes both proprioceptive and IAw, and
their psychometric properties, Mehling et al. showed that most
of the questionnaires are based on a conceptualization of
body awareness that considers the attentional focus on bodily
symptoms as a maladaptive expression of anxiety, depression, or
somatization (Mehling et al., 2009), whichmay be associated with
ES. Instead, a more recent (and alternative) conceptualization
of body awareness considers the ability to recognize subtle
bodily signals as a controlled state of sustained attention to
events that happen within the body here-and-now, which has
been integrated into numerous therapeutic approaches geared
to improve this ability. An example is mindfulness: the training
of a specific style of attention aimed at a state of mind
characterized by non-judgmental acceptance and a sense of
self that is rooted in experiencing physical sensations in the
present moment with equanimity (Thompson and Varela, 2001;
Carruthers, 2008; Fogel, 2009; Grossman, 2015). These more
recent considerations formed the basis for the development of
the MAIA (Mehling et al., 2012; see also Mehling et al., 2009,
2011), a multidimensional self-report instrument designed to
measure interoceptive body awareness. It consists of 32 items
evaluating eight aspects grouped into five dimensions. TheMAIA
attempts to overcome the limitations of previous accounts of IAw
(described above) by integrating what appear to be the hallmarks
of interoceptive body awareness: (1) its multidimensional nature;
(2) the distinction between the anxiety-related hypervigilance
and the attentional style to bodily sensations in the present
moment (which would represent a step away from the
assumptions of the interoceptive sensitivity hypothesis); (3) the
differential assessment of essential psychological aspects of the
perception and evaluation of bodily sensations. To date, the
MAIA has been translated into 13 languages (http://www.osher.
ucsf.edu/maia/) but, to our knowledge, only two adaptations
with adequate validation have been published: the German
(Bornemann et al., 2014) and Chilean (Valenzuela Moguillansky
and Reyes Reyes, 2015) versions, which both replicated the global
structure of the original MAIA.
The first aim of the present work was to provide a preliminary
validation of the Italian MAIA, by analyzing the psychometric
properties (reliability, dimensionality, and construct validity) of
the Italian translation of the MAIA. To this aim, we applied
it to a population mainly composed of female psychology
undergraduate students.
Our second aim was to investigate the relationship between
the multiple facets composing the IAw construct—as assessed by
the MAIA—and both the IAc as assessed by the HPT and the ES
personality trait. To this aim, we used a series of correlational and
regression analyses to examine the complex interplay between
the three measures of IAw, IAc, and ES, which are involved in
shaping the way individuals experience their “bodily” feelings
and emotional states. At the time of the survey (early 2013), it
was still an open question whether IAw, as measured by the 8
MAIA scales, would potentially be correlated with IAc or not.
Therefore, we aimed at investigating such a relationship with the
hypothesis that these constructs are not correlated, supporting
the idea that they are distinct and dissociable dimensions. Second,
we hypothesized that IAc may be positively correlated with ES,
possibly mediated by the arousal component of emotions. Our
third exploratory hypothesis was that different scales of the
MAIA for the IAw construct would correlate in a complex way
with ES, which may add new details to the relationship between
interoception, emotion processing, and personality traits.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 321 participants, aged between 19 and 27 years (M =
20.53, SD = 0.88), were recruited for the study. Almost all of
them were students of the University G. d’Annunzio of Chieti.
Themajority of the participants (293, representing approximately
91% of the total sample) were female (mean age = 20.49 years,
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SD = 0.85); 28 were male (mean age = 20.96 years, SD = 1.10).
This disproportion in the participants’ gender reflects the gender
distribution in the psychology student population from which
the experimental sample was mainly recruited. Of this sample,
135 female participants (mean age = 20.40 years, SD = 0.72)
volunteered to perform the Heartbeat Perception Task (HPT).
Participants gave informed consent prior to their inclusion in
the study, which was approved by the ethical committee of the
University of Chieti and conducted according to the guidelines
of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Instruments and Procedures
Italian Translation of the MAIA
We assessed the multiple aspects of our participants’
interoceptive awareness (IAw) by using a new Italian version
of the original English-language MAIA (Mehling et al., 2012).
Since no Italian version of the MAIA was available, we first
systematically translated it. In a first step, three independent
forward translations were produced, two by native Italian
speakers proficient in English, and one by a native English
speaker proficient in Italian. These translators were not
familiar with the IAw construct, but have a background in
Psychology. The three resulting provisional Italian versions
were then compared, item by item, by two of the authors (EA
and GCo) and two other researchers from the Laboratory of
Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroscience of the University
of Chieti (Marcello Costantini and Gianluca Finotti), who
were familiar with the IAw construct. Following consensus, a
provisional Italian version was drafted. Next, an English native
bilingual translator, who had a background in Psychology but
who was not familiar with the IAw construct, performed the
back-translation into English. Finally, differences between the
original English version and the back-translation were identified
and discussed with the first author of the original MAIA (WM),
and further small corrections were applied to improve and
finalize the items. The final Italian version was approved by
consensus among the same four researchers from the Laboratory
of Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroscience named above,
as well as by the first author of the original MAIA.
The MAIA is composed of 32 items on a 6-points Likert scale,
in which the participant has to rate “how often each statement
applies to you generally in daily life,” with ordinal responses
coded from 0 (“never”) to 5 (“always”). This multidimensional
instrument measures IAw on eight scales: (1) Noticing, the
awareness of one’s body sensations (4 items); (2) Not-distracting,
the tendency not to ignore or distract oneself from sensations
of pain or discomfort (3 items); (3) Not-worrying, the tendency
not to experience emotional distress or worry with sensations
of pain or discomfort (3 items); (4) Attention regulation, the
ability to sustain and control attention to body sensation (7
items); (5) Emotional awareness, the awareness of the connection
between body sensations and emotional states (5 items); (6)
Self-regulation, the ability to regulate psychological distress by
attention to body sensations (4 items); (7) Body listening, the
tendency to actively listen to the body for insight (3 items); and
(8) Trusting: the experience of one’s body as safe and trustworthy
(3 items). The score for each scale is calculated by averaging the
scores of its individual items, and thus can vary in the 0–5 range.
Emotional Susceptibility Scale
We assessed the participants’ ES by using the Italian version
of the Emotional Susceptibility Scale, a self-administered,
unidimensional instrument developed by Caprara et al. (1985;
Caprara et al., 1983) to measure the participants’ “tendency to
experience feelings of discomfort, inadequacy, and vulnerability”
after the exposure to emotionally salient stimuli. This instrument
is composed of 40 items on a 6-points Likert scale, in which the
participant has to rate “how true” each statement is for him/her,
with ordinal responses coded from 1 (“completely false for me”)
to 6 (“completely true for me”). The ES scale includes 10 control
items that do not contribute to the final score, which is obtained
by summing the scores of the 30 non-control items.
Heartbeat Perception Task
From our 321 participants, we recruited volunteers to perform
the HPT (n = 135) in the laboratory. After the participants
had arrived, they were informed about the general procedure
and the measures. The participants were seated in a comfortable
chair in a sound-attenuated room. The HPT procedure was
performed according to the mental tracking method proposed by
Schandry (1981), which was modified by adding a fourth time
interval (Pollatos et al., 2008). The four time intervals were 25,
35, 45, and 100 s and were presented in random order. During
each time interval, participants were asked to count and keep
track of their heartbeats by focusing on their heart activity and
bodily feelings. The participants were explicitly instructed not
to take their own pulse in any way or to try any other physical
manipulations; they were also discouraged from simply tracking
the number of seconds of each time interval and using that
information to estimate the number of heartbeats. After each
interval, the participants were asked to verbally report the count
or estimated number of heartbeats, which was manually recorded
by the experimenter.
Participants were distributed in three groups. In the first
two groups, the actual number of the participant’s heartbeats
was recorded by one of the authors (GCa) and a trained
assistant by means of either tactile radial arterial palpation at
the wrist or direct chest auscultation through a stethoscope. The
experimenters kept track of time using a digital stopwatch. The
beginning and end of each time interval was indicated to the
participants by the acoustic signal emitted by the stopwatch. In
the tactile arterial palpation procedure, particular care was taken
by the experimenters to avoid applying excessive pressure to the
participants’ wrist skin, which could have made it easier for the
participants to perceive their heartbeats. In the third group, the
participant’s heartbeats were recorded by another author (EA)
and a trained assistant using a three-lead electrocardiogram:
three Ag/AgCl pre-gelled electrodes (ADInstruments, UK) were
placed on the participant’s chest in an Einthoven’s triangle
configuration to record the electrocardiogram (sampling rate:
1 KHz; Powerlab, ADInstruments, UK); the heartbeats were
identified by the R peaks using the BioSig package (Vidaurre et al.,
2011) for Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA). The beginning and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1202
Calì et al. Interoception and emotional susceptibility
the end of each time interval were indicated to the participant
through acoustic signals presented via headphones. The entire
procedure was controlled by a computer running the Matlab
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The participants of
this third group were part of a larger study investigating the
physiological responses to affective stimuli.
General Procedure
Participants were asked to complete the MAIA and the ES scale.
Both scales were administered in paper-and-pencil versions in
classroom settings during psychology courses or, for a small
number of participants recruited from campus facilities, in the
laboratory setting. Data collection was conducted by the first
author (GCa) and trained assistants. The purpose of the study
was briefly explained to the participants, who were informed
that they were free to respond (but asked to respond truthfully),
and that their collaboration would potentially be requested again
at a later stage of the study. The HPT was performed in a
separate session as detailed in Section Heartbeat Perception
Task.
Data Analysis
Missing values for items of the MAIA and ES scale were imputed
using the series mean method, that is, by replacing them with
the mean of all participants’ values for the same item. For the
MAIA, there were on average 0.97 missing values (SD = 2.63)
for each item, whereas the missing values were, on average,
1.18 (SD = 1.20) for each item of the ES scale (out of the
total of 321 responses per item). The scores of the eight scales
of the MAIA were computed by averaging the values of the
items of each scale, according to the final factorial structure
we obtained (see Section Psychometric Properties and Factorial
Structure of the Italian MAIA). The ES score was computed for
each participant by averaging the score of the 30 non-control
items of the ES scale, thus obtaining a value ranging from
1 to 6.
The participants’ performance in perceiving their heartbeats
during each time interval of the HPT was calculated as a relative
error score, that is, the absolute difference between reported
and actual number of heartbeats divided by the actual number
of heartbeats. Next, in line with standard practice (e.g., Koch
and Pollatos, 2014), the participants’ interoceptive accuracy
(IAc) score was computed according to the formula: IAc = 1/4
6 [1 − (|recorded heartbeats − counted heartbeats|/recorded
heartbeats)]. We then tested for differences in IAc scores
between the three groups of participants (see Section Heartbeat
Perception Task). We carried out pairwise comparisons with
two-tailed independent-samples t-test and the corresponding
Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al., 2009) for accepting the null
hypothesis of no differences between groups.
We first investigated the preliminary psychometric properties
and the dimensionality of the Italian version of the MAIA, in
order to evaluate whether the factor structure of the original
version would replicate in the Italian version. To this aim,
we carried out an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and an
analysis of covariances within the framework of confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA), and assessed the reliability of the MAIA
scales. The hypothesized model was estimated via maximum
likelihood (ML). For the evaluation of covariance structure
models we used the chi-square goodness of fit supplemented
by the comparative fit index (CFI), the root-mean-square error
of approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root-mean-
square residual (SRMR). The CFI (Bentler, 1990) assesses the
reduction in misfit of a population target model relative to a
population baseline model in which no structure is specified
(i.e., all correlations among variables are equal to zero). Values
of at least 0.90 are considered adequate for good models
(Bentler, 1990). The RMSEA is a measure of the discrepancy
of the variance covariance matrix of fitted model from the
starting variance covariancematrix per degree of freedom. Values
lower than 0.05 reflect a small error of approximation and
values between 0.05 and 0.08 reflect an acceptable error of
approximation. Values greater than 0.10 constitute poor model
fit (Browne and Cudeck, 1993). The SRMR is an absolute
index of the discrepancy between reproduced and observed
correlations. Hu and Bentler (1998) suggested a cutoff criterion
of 0.08, with higher values indicating poorer fit to the empirical
data and values lower than 0.05 indicating an excellent fit.
Finally, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and corrected item-
scale correlations were used to assess the reliability of the
scales.
Next, we explored the complex interplay between the three
constructs of ES, IAw, and IAc. We first calculated the Pearson
correlations between each pair of variables, including ES score,
scores of the eight scales of MAIA (as derived from the
factorial analyses, see Section Psychometric Properties and
Factorial Structure of the Italian MAIA)1, and IAc score, with
pairwise deletion of cases with missing data. For a more
precise investigation of the actual relationship between these
measures, partial correlations were calculated between each
pair of variables, controlling for all the other variables. We
carried out multiple regression analyses to investigate in more
detail the relationship between the participants’ ES scores (the
dependent variable) and the eight MAIA scores and the IAc score
(continuous predictors), as well as all two-way interactions. The
model that best explained the ES scores, with the appropriate
number of predictors, was selected by the method of the
best subset as implemented in Statistica (StatSoft). In brief,
all possible regression models with up to a defined number
(subset) of predictors were evaluated; among those with the same
number of predictors, the model with the highest percentage
of explained variance (R2) was provisionally selected as best
explaining the ES scores. This procedure identifies the best model
for any number of predictors (Neter et al., 1989; as cited in
StatSoft Inc, 2013). Finally, models with different numbers of
predictors were compared by testing for the significance of the
R2 difference taking into account the tolerance index, a measure
of multicollinearity among the predictors included in the model.
Statistical analyses were conducted through Statistical Software
for Social Science (SPSS), Statistica (StatSoft), and Structural
Equation Modeling (EQS).
1Note that when we applied the original structure of theMAIA the analyses yielded
similar results, and thus are not reported here for the sake of brevity.
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Results
We first describe the preliminary psychometric properties and
the dimensionality of the Italian MAIA and compare them with
those of both the original version and the two other published
German (Bornemann et al., 2014) and Chilean (Valenzuela
Moguillansky and Reyes Reyes, 2015) translations.
Psychometric Properties and Factorial Structure
of the Italian MAIA
The appropriateness of the factor analysis as a model for
analyzing the data was supported by the Bartlett’s test of
sphericity (χ2 = 3129.50p < 0.001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (0.822). Assessment of
distributions showed that all but one item had skewness and
kurtosis values in the (−1, 1) range (item 4 had a skewness value
of−1.054, see Table 1).
For the EFA, we extracted factors using the principal axis
factoring method and factor loadings higher than ± 0.30 were
TABLE 1 | Univariate descriptive item statistics (n = 321).
Item Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Item1 2.47 1.23 −0.01 −0.43
Item2 2.94 1.30 −0.34 −0.46
Item3 3.09 1.20 −0.45 −0.28
Item4 3.69 1.24 −0.05 0.72
Item5 2.74 1.36 −0.12 −0.76
Item6 2.79 1.21 0.05 −0.71
Item7 2.43 1.37 0.13 −0.67
Item8 2.32 1.26 0.13 −0.78
Item9 2.70 1.15 −0.02 −0.56
Item10 2.19 1.20 0.10 −0.68
Item11 2.57 1.27 −0.26 −0.58
Item12 2.83 1.13 −0.26 −0.27
Item13 2.77 1.32 −0.32 −0.56
Item14 2.48 1.12 −0.10 −0.31
Item15 2.68 1.02 −0.27 0.07
Item16 2.63 1.16 −0.04 −0.45
Item17 3.01 1.01 −0.03 0.11
Item18 3.00 1.27 −0.40 −0.54
Item19 2.79 1.28 −0.13 −0.57
Item20 3.41 1.14 −0.67 0.14
Item21 3.74 1.16 −0.92 0.44
Item22 3.57 1.16 −0.93 0.58
Item23 2.60 1.19 −0.09 −0.51
Item24 2.44 1.15 −0.03 −0.47
Item25 3.02 1.21 −0.47 −0.22
Item26 2.45 1.21 0.02 −0.56
Item27 2.95 1.08 −0.38 −0.19
Item28 1.98 1.17 0.32 −0.34
Item29 2.02 1.21 0.29 −0.43
Item30 2.80 1.39 −0.19 −0.70
Item31 2.88 1.32 −0.14 −0.56
Item32 3.35 1.16 −0.52 −0.05
considered as building criteria for the EFA model. In order to
determine the number of factors to retain, we examined the
eigenvalues (Cattell and Vogelmann, 1977) (extraction criterion:
eigenvalue> 1; varimax rotation). After the successive deletion of
three items (7, 10, and 12) that did not load significantly on the
theoretical factor, and after the interpretation of the factor scores,
the eight factors solution, accounting for the 47.74% of the total
variance, was also corroborated by an inspection of the scree-plot
of eigenvalues (the first 10 eigenvalues were 6.566, 2.542, 1.942,
1.679, 1.520, 1.283, 1.170, 1.089, 0.931, and 0.883). This eight
factors solution clusters the remaining items as in the original
version, with the exception of items 19 (“When something is
wrong in my life, I can feel it in my body.”), which loaded on
both its original factor Emotional Awareness (0.469) and on Body
Listening (0.377) (for a similar result, see Bornemann et al., 2014),
and 4 (“I notice changes in my breathing, such as whether it
slows down or speeds up.”), which loaded on a different factor
(Emotional Awareness: 0.387) than its original factor (Noticing:
0.147). We then carried out a CFA, which showed that the eight
factors solution obtained with the EFA provided an adequate fit
to the data [χ2(349) = 408.99; p = 0.015; RMSEA = 0.023 (90%
CI= 0.011, 0.032); SRMR= 0.057, CFI= 0.974].
Table 2 shows mean values, standard deviation, average item-
scale correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas of the Italian MAIA.
The Cronbach’s alpha values varied between 0.53 and 0.80.
Compared to the alpha values of the original MAIA (Mehling
et al., 2012) by means of the Feldt’s test for independent
samples (Feldt, 1986), the alpha values of the Italian MAIA
were significantly lower than in the original MAIA for five
scales (Attention regulation, Self-regulation, Body listening, Not-
worrying, and Not-distracting), and not statistically different
for the remaining three scales. Similar results were obtained
when comparing the alpha values of the Italian MAIA with
those of both the German and Chilean versions of the MAIA.
Notwithstanding these differences, it should be noted that our
Cronbach’s alpha values were highly correlated to those of the
English, German, and Chilean versions (r = 0.855, 0.973, and
0.928; all ps≤ 0.007).Moreover, the pattern of values we observed
was very similar to that of the other MAIA versions, with the
Noticing, Not-worrying, and Not-distracting scales consistently
showing the lower Cronbach’s alpha values among the scales (all
ps≤ 0.0001, Feldt’s test for dependent samples; Feldt et al., 1987).
Table 2 also shows the Pearson’s interscale correlations. The
results revealed a complex pattern of intercorrelations between
the scores of the eight scales of MAIA, with a high percentage of
significant correlations (16 out of 28 possible pairs, representing
approximately 57%, with α = 0.05). The only two scales that
seem to be relatively independent from the other scales were Not-
worrying and Not-distracting, which composed the dimension
“Emotional Reactions and Attentional Response to a Sensation”
in the original MAIA (Mehling et al., 2012). Again, this pattern
of results was consistent with that found in the other available
versions of the MAIA. In fact, the Pearson’s correlations between
the interscale correlation matrices of the Italian MAIA, on the
one side, and those of the English, German, and Chilean MAIA,
on the other side, were very high (respectively, 0.896, 0.925,
and 0.925; all ps < 0.001), highlighting a high second-order
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isomorphism (Shepard and Chipman, 1970) of the correlational
structure of the MAIA across these three languages and cultures.
Heartbeat Perception Task
There were no significant differences in IAc scores between the
three groups of participants (see Section Heartbeat Perception
Task), suggesting that the method of measurement of the
heartbeats (ECG, stethoscope, wrist palpation) did not influence
the participants’ IAc. Mean IAc scores in the three groups
were 0.503 (SD = 0.191), 0.542 (SD = 0.182), and 0.540 (SD
= 0.185), respectively. These were not different in pairwise
comparisons by t-tests [ECG vs. stethoscope: t(90) = 0.987,
p = 0.327; ECG vs. wrist palpation: t(90) = 0.721, p = 0.473;
stethoscope vs. wrist palpation: t(84) = 0.939, p = 0.350].
More importantly, Bayesian t-tests (Rouder et al., 2009) provided
support for the null hypothesis across the three methods with
JZS Bayes factors of 3.96, 4.90, and 4.02, respectively, for the
same pairwise comparisons. Therefore, we felt justified in pooling
the data across heartbeat recording methods for our subsequent
analyses.
Inter-constructs Relationships
Table 2 shows the Pearson’s correlations between the eight
scales of the Italian MAIA and both the ES and IAc scores of
the participants. The analysis revealed significant correlations
between the ES scale and four of the eight scales of the MAIA:
Not-worrying, Attention regulation, Emotional awareness, and
Trusting (respectively, r = −0.359, −0.244, 0.187, and −0.331;
all ps≤ 0.001; n = 321). The IAc score was weakly but statistically
significantly correlated with only one MAIA scale: Attention
regulation (r = 0.200, p = 0.020, n = 135).
Given the complex pattern of intercorrelations among the
MAIA scales, we also calculated partial correlations between
each pair of variables, controlling for all other variables. This
analysis essentially confirms the results of the previous one
and revealed weak but statistically significant partial correlations
(rpartial) between the ES scale and the same four MAIA scales
that emerged from the regular correlation analysis (respectively,
rpartial = −0.339,−0.222, 0.212,−0.289; all ps≤ 0.001; n = 321),
with an additional significant partial correlation for the Body
Listening scale (rpartial = 0.128, p = 0.023; Table 3). Moreover,
the weak but statistically significant correlation between the IAc
score and the MAIA Attention Regulation scale was confirmed
by the partial correlation analysis (rpartial = 0.226, p = 0.011,
n = 135).
Since the correlational analyses showed that the IAc score was
not reliably related to the ES score, and since a first multiple
regression analyses showed that IAc did not reliably predict
ES score (neither individually nor in interaction with other
predictors), we chose to exclude it from the list of continuous
predictors for the multiple regression analysis, in order to have
a larger sample of valid cases (n = 321, the participants
who completed both the MAIA and ES scales, instead of n =
135 for the subsample of participants who also performed the
HPT) and, thus, increase the statistical power. The subsequent
multiple regression analyses, performed with the best subset
method as detailed in the Data Analysis Section, revealed a
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TABLE 3 | Partial correlations between IAw scales, ES, and IAc.
Measures Interscale/Inter-construct partial correlationsa
IAw (MAIA, n = 321) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Noticing 0.424 0.970 <0.001 0.022 0.189 0.003 0.350 0.271 0.236
2 Not-distracting 0.045 0.076 0.021 0.364 0.658 0.713 0.846 0.094 0.939
3 Not-worrying 0.002 −0.100 0.624 0.075 0.351 0.403 0.095 <0.001 0.628
4 Attention regulation 0.217 −0.130 0.028 0.001 0.329 0.112 0.001 <0.001 0.011
5 Emotional awareness 0.129 0.051 −0.100 0.194 <0.001 0.005 0.868 <0.001 0.644
6 Self regulation 0.074 −0.025 −0.053 0.055 0.214 <0.001 <0.001 0.093 0.487
7 Body listening 0.165 0.021 0.047 0.090 0.157 0.403 0.159 0.023 0.685
8 Trusting −0.053 0.011 −0.094 0.194 0.009 0.242 0.079 <0.001 0.583
9 ES (n = 321) 0.062 −0.095 −0.339 −0.222 0.212 −0.095 0.128 −0.289 0.710
10 IAc (HPT, n = 135) −0.106 −0.007 0.043 0.226 −0.041 −0.062 0.036 0.049 0.033
aPartial correlations are shown in the lower triangle with corresponding p-values in the upper triangle. Significant correlations are indicated in bold.
model that included three predictors as the best model to explain
the participants’ ES scores. This model included, ordered by
the percentage of explained variance, the interaction between
Attention regulation and Trusting [β = −0.413, SE = 0.049,
t(317) = 8.142, p < 0.001], Not-worrying [β = −0.295, SE =
0.048, t(317) = 6.123, p < 0.001], and Emotional awareness
(β = 0.241, SE = 0.050, t(317) = 4.829, p < 0.001) as
predictors, explaining 29.87% of the variance [F(3, 317) = 45.01,
p < 0.001], with good tolerance values (≥0.883). Therefore,
participants with higher ES scores reported more emotional
distress or worry with sensations of pain or discomfort (Not-
worrying), higher awareness of the connection between body
sensations and emotional states (Emotional awareness), and were
either less able to sustain and control attention to body sensation
(Attention regulation) or less prone to experience their own body
as a safe and trustworthy place (Trusting). In particular, the
interaction between Attention regulation and Trusting revealed
that the participants who had a score near zero in at least one of
these scales also had higher ES scores, that is, were more prone
to experience feelings of discomfort, helplessness, inadequacy,
and vulnerability due to the inability to control their reactions
in negative situations (either real or imagined), irrespective of
their score in the other scale; conversely, only participants who
showed high scores in both these scales reported to have low ES.
It is important here to note that the significant effects revealed
in this multiple correlation analysis concern the same variables
for which we found significant regular and partial correlations
with the ES score, thus highlighting the stability of these findings
but, at the same time, revealing a more complex pattern of
relationships between the ES and the multiple facets of the IAw,
as evaluated by the MAIA.
Discussion
In the present study, we aimed to test the psychometric
properties of the new Italian translation of the MAIA and
explore the complex interplay between three constructs that
contribute in shaping how we experience our “bodily” feelings
and emotional states, that is: interoceptive accuracy (IAc),
interoceptive awareness (IAw), and emotional susceptibility (ES).
First, analyses of the preliminary psychometric properties and
the factorial structure of the Italian version of the MAIA
revealed that it has acceptable reliability and a dimensionality
that is comparable to that of the other available MAIA versions
(Mehling et al., 2012; Bornemann et al., 2014; Valenzuela
Moguillansky and Reyes Reyes, 2015). However, this validation
is limited, and the present data should be considered as
a first, preliminary validation of the MAIA in the Italian
population, as we tested it in a sample of 321 mostly female
undergraduate Psychology students that is hardly representative
of the Italian population. Therefore, further examinations on a
more representative sample are needed.
Second, our analyses elucidate the complex relationship
between distinct dimensions of IAw and ES and add new data
to the discriminatory and convergent validity of the MAIA
scales. Our results from correlational analyses revealed that the
participants’ scores on four of the eight MAIA scales, namely
Not-worrying, Emotional awareness, Attention regulation, and
Trusting were reliably correlated with the participants’ ES.
Multiple regression analyses further elucidated the specific
contribution of each MAIA scale in explaining the variability in
the participants’ ES. These analyses revealed that, while both the
Not-worrying and Emotional awareness scales were independent
significant predictors of the participants’ ES scores, the Attention
regulation and Trusting scales interacted in explaining the
(larger portion of the) variability in the participants’ ES
scores. Our results thus showed that two specific aspects of
IAw independently contributed in explaining the variability
in participants’ ES. First, Not-worrying was significantly and
negatively related to ES: participants who reported to be more
prone to experience emotional distress or worry in response to
negative body sensations (i.e., with a score near zero in the Not-
worrying scale) also reported to be more prone to experience
discomfort, vulnerability, and inadequacy in controlling their
excitement, arousal, and reactions in situations of danger, offense,
or attack (Caprara et al., 1983), as evidenced by high ES scores.
This result suggests a tight link between these two constructs,
which makes sense, as both are related to measures of trait
anxiety (see Caprara et al., 1983; Mehling et al., 2012), and
situations of danger, threat, offense, or attack all lead to the
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activation of the sympathetic nervous system, with subsequent
strong bodily signals of alarm. As shown by Mehling et al.
(2012), the MAIA Not-worrying scale was related to the Physical
Concern subscale of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Zinbarg et al.,
1997), which assesses the proneness or enduring tendency to
worry when experiencing bodily sensations of discomfort, such
as quickened respiration or heartbeat and chest constriction.
These sensations can be triggered by “emotionally salient stimuli”
and the “situations of danger, offense, or attack” that contribute
to the definition of the ES construct and, therefore, are all
phenomena that individuals with high ES experience as a
state of negative affect. Thus, to not worry would mean to
accept and tolerate these negative body signals, to have a
mindful, nonjudgmental acceptance in experiencing the physical
sensations in the present moment (Mehling et al., 2012), and
not to “burden oneself with them,” while experiencing feelings
of helplessness, inadequacy, and vulnerability (Caprara et al.,
1985).
Next, although the Emotional awareness scale was
significantly related to the participants’ ES, those who reported to
have high awareness of the connection between their emotional
states and body sensations also had high ES. At first glance, this
finding may seem counterintuitive: one could expect to find
the opposite relation between the Emotional awareness and the
ES. However, a recent study provides findings in line with our
results. Indeed, Lichev et al. (2015) found that individuals with
high emotional awareness showed stronger (implicit) affective
reactivity. Moreover, the results of an analysis conducted by
Mehling et al. (2012) may provide some insights to help us better
understand how the multiple aspects of the IAw relate to anxiety.
The authors showed that Emotional awareness was the only scale
that showed a specific—even if marginally significant—positive
relation with the trait anxiety measure, despite its negative
association with anxiety measures in a simple correlational
analysis. Follow-up regression analyses showed that a possible
cause of this inversion of the association between anxiety and
Emotional awareness was the portion of shared variance between
the latter measure and another MAIA measure, Self-regulation.
In other words, even if Emotional awareness was negatively
related to anxiety when taken alone, this relation became
positive after having removed the portion of variance shared
with Self-regulation. This suggests that the Emotional awareness
scale would assess distinct aspects of this construct that may
be negatively and positively related to anxiety (respectively,
those shared with the Self-regulation scale and those that are
specific to the Emotional awareness). This interpretation led
the authors to conclude that “mere awareness of how body
sensations correspond to emotional states [i.e., the Emotional
awareness], without the ability to use awareness of those
sensations to reduce distress [i.e., the Self-regulation], could
increase anxiety” (Mehling et al., 2012). Therefore, it is possible
that the positive relationship we found between Emotional
awareness and ES was mostly driven by the same specific aspects
that Mehling and colleagues found to be related to an increased
trait anxiety, which in turn is strongly related to ES (Caprara
et al., 1983). Albeit speculative, this possible explanation
highlights the need to conduct further studies and intensify the
efforts to clarify how specific aspects of body awareness affect
anxiety.
Finally, and more importantly, the multiple regression
analysis showed an even stronger relationship between the
participants’ ES and the interaction between Attention regulation
and Trusting. This result is of particular interest, as it reveals
a pattern of relationships between the ES and these facets of
the IAw that is more complex than it would at first appear by
relying on the correlational analyses. The significant interaction
between Attention regulation and Trusting reveals their non-
additive effect in explaining the ES variability: participants who
had a score near zero in either the Attention regulation or the
Trusting scale also had higher ES scores, that is, reported to be
highly prone to experiencing feelings of discomfort, helplessness,
inadequacy, and vulnerability due to the inability to control their
reactions in negative situations, irrespective of their score in the
other scale; on the contrary, only participants who showed high
scores in both these scales reported to have a low ES. This result
indicates that, when taken alone, neither of these two abilities is
enough to protect oneself against the negative feelings implied
by a high ES score. In other words, the inclination to experience
the body as a safe and trustworthy place (i.e., a high Trusting
score) also needs the concomitant ability to actively direct and
maintain the attention on the body signals (i.e., a high Attention
regulation score) to allow one to control feelings and reactivity
in negative situations. In line with this result, different authors
considered the skills in attention regulation as a precondition for
the capacity to be nonreactive and tolerant of body sensations,
which are key elements of a more general mindfulness approach
to experience (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2006; Mehling et al., 2009,
2012; Hölzel et al., 2011). Our data emphasize that focusing
attention on body signals can be maladaptive if one does not
“feel at home” in his/her own body. Therefore, good attention
regulation skills (as assessed by the MAIA) should be considered
as just one necessary—but not sufficient—precondition of a
beneficial mind-body relation and emotional stability, even when
it is viewed as related to a “positive” mode of mind, or mindful
presence (Mehling et al., 2009), (i.e., “focusing attention directly
on immediately experienced feelings,” instead of “[having an]
abstract ruminative self-focus,” Mehling et al., 2012; see also
Watkins and Teasdale, 2004; Shapiro et al., 2006).
Furthermore, our correlational analyses revealed that
Attention regulation was the only facet of the IAw, as assessed
by the MAIA, to be significantly, albeit weakly, related to
the participants’ IAc, i.e., their ability to accurately perceive
their bodily signals, as assessed by the performance in the
HPT. This result is consistent with the fact that the Attention
regulation scale assesses the participants’ perception of their
ability to actively direct and maintain attention on body signals,
which is the very ability that was required to have a good
performance in the HPT. This result is consistent with the
report that Attention regulation was found to be the MAIA scale
with the strongest correlation (Mehling et al., 2012) with the
Private Body Consciousness subscale of the Body Consciousness
Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981), which specifically relates
to the ability to notice bodily sensations such as the heart
beating, thus involving IAc skills. Apart from this single, albeit
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interesting, significant result, the results of our analyses suggest
the substantial independence of the IAc and IAw measures,
supporting the notion that the assessment of IAc alone cannot
provide a full comprehension of IAw. This independence
is in line with more recent findings showing that subjective
self-report measures of interoception ability, such as those
provided by the MAIA, may diverge significantly from objective
measures of IAc (Garfinkel et al., 2015). As a limitation of our
IAc measures we need to note that three different measures
of heart rate measures were used including manual palpation
and chest auscultation that would potentially interfere with the
participants’ self-assessment. However, our analyses supported
equivalence of the three methods. In addition, using exclusively
self-report to assess IAw is a limitation that in future studies
can—at least partially—be addressed following the method
suggested by Garfinkel et al. (2015).
The complex pattern of correlations between the IAw,
IAc, and ES revealed by our analyses would induce another
important consideration supporting the above conclusion. While
the correlational analyses showed that ES was not significantly
related to the ability to accurately perceive bodily signals (IAc),
multiple regression analyses showed that it was significantly
and specifically related to different facets of IAw, particularly
to the interaction between Trusting and Attention Regulation,
which is the only MAIA scale to be related to the IAc. This
pattern of results appears to provide additional support against
the interoceptive sensitivity hypothesis (Ehlers and Breuer, 1992),
which equates the IAw and IAc constructs, and, again, in favor
of a conceptual distinction between these two constructs, as
proposed by Ceunen et al. (2013) and Garfinkel et al. (2015).
Moreover, the lack of a significant relation between IAc and
ES would suggest that this latter construct does not simply
correspond to the subjective experience of the intensity of
emotional states. It has been shown that individuals with high
IAc experience emotions as more intense (e.g., Wiens et al.,
2000) and report them with a greater emphasis on the arousal
dimension (Barrett et al., 2004). Based on these findings, we
hypothesized that individuals with high IAc may be more
emotionally susceptible, as they would tend to have greater
arousal/excitement, especially “in situations, real, or imagined, of
danger, offense, threat, or attack.” Contrary to our hypothesis,
our finding indicates that this presumably greater activation
in response to emotional stimuli does not automatically lead
to the “feelings of discomfort, helplessness, inadequacy, and
vulnerability,” and the “state of negative affect and a tendency to
place oneself in a defensive position” that characterize individuals
with high ES, as these feelings/emotions triggered by highly
arousing situations are critically “due to the inability [of the
individual] to control” this arousal/excitement (Caprara et al.,
1983). This explanation is supported by reports (e.g., Füstös
et al., 2013) that, although individuals with high IAc experienced
negative emotions as more arousing, they were at the same
time better able to actively down-regulate affect-related states,
suggesting that the accurate perception of bodily states may be
essential for adequate emotion regulation.
Alternatively, it has also been shown (Van’t Wout et al.,
2013) that IAc is not related to self-reported levels of the
habitual use of emotion regulatory strategies, as assessed by
the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ: Gross and John,
2003). Therefore, it is possible that a positive association
between IAc and the subjective experience of the intensity
of emotions, combined with no association between IAc and
emotion regulation ability canceled out any association between
IAc and ES. Regrettably, we did not check our participants’
habitual use of emotion regulation strategies, and thus we cannot
verify this possible interpretation. Taken together, these findings
suggest that the relationship between IAc and ES/emotion
regulation appears to be more complex than we initially thought,
and further investigation is needed to shed light on this issue.
Support for the conceptual distinction of the IAw and IAc
constructs also comes from the analysis of the pattern of
relations that these two constructs have with anxiety-related
traits, which resembles a sort of “double dissociation.” First,
as showed by Mehling et al. (2012), different MAIA scales
are negatively correlated with trait anxiety, a general stable
tendency to respond with anxiety to perceived threats in the
environment, and to a lesser degree with anxiety sensitivity, a
dispositional trait characterized by the fear of feelings related to
anxiety, based on the belief that these symptoms have physical,
psychological, or social consequences (Reiss and McNally, 1985;
Reiss, 1991). Conversely, the HPT shows the opposite pattern,
with stronger positive correlations with the anxiety sensitivity
and weaker correlations with the trait anxiety (Domschke et al.,
2010), suggesting that individuals with high anxiety sensitivity
are generally more accurate in detecting their own heartbeat.
Second, an increased IAc has been proposed as a risk factor
for the development of state anxiety, trait anxiety or clinical
disorders related to anxiety due to an attentional bias involving
catastrophic misinterpretations of somatic signals (McNally,
2002; Schmidt et al., 2008; Perez Benitez et al., 2009; Domschke
et al., 2010). Conversely, mindful meditation, and thus potentially
improved IAw, is associated with the transition from (a) a form of
conceptual and narrative thinking that is susceptible to evaluative
interferences to (b) a form of experiential, non-evaluative,
immediate sensing, in which the attention is focused directly
on present-moment feelings and bodily sensations (Mehling
et al., 2009; Daubenmier et al., 2013). These distinct modes of
mind can thus determine whether body awareness is beneficial
or maladaptive: “focusing attention directly on immediately
experienced feelings appears to be adaptive, whereas an abstract
ruminative self-focus appears to be maladaptive” (Mehling et al.,
2012).
These distinct modes of minds correspond to distinct forms
of self-awareness that are habitually integrated but, as shown
with fMRI by Farb et al. (2007), “can be dissociated through
attentional training: the self across time [i.e., the narrative focus]
and the self in the present moment [i.e., the experiential focus].”
Following 8 weeks of mindfulness meditation, an experiential
focus was associated with three fMRI findings: (i) reduced activity
of the medial prefrontal cortex, which supports narrative self-
awareness by linking subjective experiences across time (Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004), providing narrative self-reference that
preserves the identity stability across time (Gallagher, 2004); (ii)
increased engagement of a right lateralized network (including
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the insula) for higher-order representations of the self (Critchley
et al., 2004) through moment-to-moment self-reference and
“experiential” focus, and (iii) decoupling of the functional
connectivity between these two sets of areas. These findings
are also in line with other studies investigating how meditation
affects IAc and IAwmeasures. It has been shown that meditation,
contemplative practice, or other mind–body interventions can
longitudinally improve different facets of the IAw construct (e.g.,
Bornemann et al., 2014), but they seem to have no effect on the
ability to accurately perceive bodily signals, as assessed by the
HPT (Nielsen and Kaszniak, 2006; Khalsa et al., 2008; Melloni
et al., 2013; Parkin et al., 2013).
To sum up, our analyses confirmed the factorial structure of
the original MAIA in the new Italian version of the instrument.
Moreover, they (a) confirmed the substantial independence of
the IAc from self-reported IAw, (b) showed independence of
IAc from ES measure, and (c) revealed a complex pattern
of relationships between ES and distinct dimensions of IAw,
such as Not-worrying, Emotional awareness, and the interplay
between Attention regulation and Trusting. Taken together,
these findings further highlight the need for a multidimensional
assessment of the IAw construct and for a more in-depth
analysis of its relationship with personality traits, such as ES or
neuroticism.
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